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This paper uses a multi-methods approach to explore the social psychological
construction of stigma towards the unemployed. Study 1a uses thematic analysis to
explore frames used by political elites in speeches at U.K. national party conferences
between 1996 and 2016 (n = 43); in study 1b, we track the usage of these frames in six
national newspapers (n = 167,723 articles) over the same period showing an increase in
the use of negative frames. Study 1c shows that these are associated with national
attitudes towards welfare recipients using the British Social Attitude Survey.We find the
‘Othering’ frame is correlated with negative attitudes towards the unemployed, even
when controlling for the unemployment rate. This finding supports the claim that social
attitudes are related to frames produced in the political and media spheres. We provide
theoretical integration between social representations theory and framing which affords
development in both domains.
Following the financial crisis in 2008, successive UK governments have implemented
austeritymeasures to reduce public spendingwhich has particularly impacted thewelfare
state (Reeves, Basu, McKee, Marmot, & Stuckler, 2013). These changes coincided with a
hardening of media reporting and political rhetoric associated with unemployed people
receiving welfare payments (Fletcher, Flint, Batty, & McNeil, 2016). Notions such as
‘scroungers and shirkers’ have become a prevalent part of public discourse (Jensen &
Tyler, 2015; Patrick, 2016). Though it is often argued that this negative rhetoric is
associated with attitude changes in the population, negatively impacting welfare
recipients by stigmatizing them, this relationship has not been explored empirically.
Thus, this paper aims to investigate whether there is a relationship between (1)
political discourse, (2) newspaper reporting, and (3) public attitudes towards the
unemployed. Hence, we look at the association between the framing of a specific issue
(unemployment) by politicians and its reproduction in national newspapers.We then test
whether there is a relationship between the reproduction of political frames and negative
attitudes towards the unemployed at a national level.
Specifically, we map the prevalence of discursive frames with a dictionary of words,
derived from thematic analysis of political party leaders’ speeches. We use the dictionary
to indicate the presence of each frame in six national newspapers over 22 years to
demonstrate how the prevalence of different frames has changed over time. The time
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series is then examined alongside British Social Attitude (BSA) Survey data concerning the
unemployed and unemployment. We find that negative media frames used when
reporting about unemployment are correlated with negative attitudes towards the
unemployed in the population, evenwhen controlling for the actual unemployment rate.
Framing
Framing is a widely used concept in social psychology, political science, and commu-
nication and is defined as ‘the process by which people develop a particular
conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue’ (Chong &
Druckman, 2007, p. 104). Framing operates through communication; for example,
economic discourse in the public sphere may be framed in ways that highlight certain
elements (e.g., growth) and not others (e.g., average wage). Research on framing
supposes that the prevalence, or exposure, to certain frames influences attitudes of those
exposed to the frame. This is known as the ‘framing effect’. Much research has explored
how the ‘frames in the communications of elites (e.g., politicians, media outlets, interest
groups) influence citizens’ frames and attitudes’ (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 109).
Framing in the context of elite communication is said to operate by; making new
information available; making information which is already known accessible (priming)
and/or making certain information more important for the evaluation of a target (Brewer,
Graf, & Willnat, 2003; Chong & Druckman, 2007).
Therefore, framing can be considered a political process, often originating from
political leaders (Jacoby, 2000). This conceptualization is known in the literature as
emphasis framing. Accordingly, public opinion or social attitudes are developed through
the interaction of political elites (high profile, senior) and media, whereby politicians
frame issues in ways which are beneficial to their party-political goals (Druckman, 2001).
This approachmay entail emphasizing specific elements of an issue, such as individualized
explanations for unemployment (Feather, 1985; Lewis, Snell, & Furnham, 1987), which,
when reproduced in mass media, focus the public’s evaluation of unemployment only in
those terms (Nelson, 2004).
Moreover, research has shown that influential mass media (i.e., newspapers of record
such as The Daily Telegraph) are narratively reproduced by other media forms such as
tabloid press and digital news outlets (Wang & Shoemaker, 2011). Thus, frames used by
politicians are likely to be widely shared in newspaper outlets and therefore highly
accessible within the social milieu of their origin.
Overall, the literature suggests that framing operates through the reproduction of
narratives used by political elites in elite media, which are then co-opted by other media
sources. It is important to note that this process is likely to influence, and be influenced
by, the attitudes and frames-in-thought (an individual’s pre-existing considerations in
evaluating a target) of the public in an interactive and iterative process. As such framing is
not a unidirectional process, rather it informs and is informed by existing public opinion.
Social psychology and framing
Framing is closely related to the theory of social representations (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999;
Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011; Jovchelovitch, 2007; Moscovici, 2000) that has been
directly deployed in framing research (Uzelgun&Castro, 2015). Social representations are
the socially constructed, everyday knowledge that enables humans to interact with the
world around them, including other humans, physical andmetaphysical objects. The two
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theories are linked through their attention to knowledge production and common-sense
making. Connecting social representations theory (SRT) and framing is empirically useful
as SRT provides several concepts that offer analytical power to framing theory. For
instance, SRT distinguishes between knowledge that is hegemonic (widely shared, almost
universally accepted), emancipated (shared among sub-groups), and polemic (contro-
versial notions and conflicts; Moscovici, 1988; Mouro & Castro, 2012).
Research on framing in mass media may track the conversion of specific represen-
tations from polemic to hegemonic or vice versa. Mapping out these transformations and
transitions offers an inroad to understanding how frames – and the ideas, values, and
meanings they convey – travel and change in public spheres.
Social representations are developed in dialogue with others (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999).
As such, representation entails the consideration of alternative ideas and other groups in
their formation (Gillespie, 2008; Jovchelovitch, 1995). In any given public sphere,
hegemonic, polemic, and emancipated representations originating within different
interest groups coexist and come into tension.
Thus, from this perspective, framing entails a negotiation between politicians, the
mass media, and the polity about themeaning of a specific issue. Politicians, in framing an
issue, consider the expectations, beliefs, and possible reactions of the electorate and
media in a self-other dynamic. This pattern fits well with what we have defined earlier as
the framing process, aptly describing an interaction between different interests to define
an issue. Thus, social representational dynamics are likely to underpin both the efficacy of
frames used by politicians and media, but also the content and form they take.
The present context and study
Within the present study, it is important to note that UK welfare recipients have come to
the forefront of political and media discourse in the context of austerity, following the
financial crisis of 2008. It is argued that the crisis and resulting austerity precipitated
changes to social security provisions including increased conditionality for out-of-work
benefits such as Jobseekers Allowance (JSA)/Universal Credit (UC), which is the main
form of assistance available to the unemployed (Dwyer & Wright, 2014). These changes
are argued to have influenced the ways unemployed people and unemployment are
discussed in the media, leading to a rise in negative representations (Jensen, 2014) and a
general assumption that stigmatization of those receiving welfare benefits is hegemonic
(Fletcher et al., 2016; Shildrick, MacDonald, & Furlong, 2014).
Specifically, academic and lay explanations of the rise of stigmatization of the
unemployed locate its cause with media and political elites (Shildrick et al., 2014). These
elite actors havemarginalizedwelfare recipients to provide a pretext that justifies reduced
and more conditional welfare spending through the creation of an anti-welfare common
sense (Jensen & Tyler, 2015).
Empirically, this relationship would entail a positive association between negative
media framing of the unemployed and negative attitudes towards the unemployed in the
population. However, studies have not specifically investigated the relationship between
political framing, media framing, and attitudes on a national level concerning unemploy-
ment. To investigate this,we conduct three related studies to understand possible framing
effects on attitudes towards the unemployed in the United Kingdom.
In an exploratory analysis, we look at how politicians frame unemployment and the
unemployed. Building on this analysis and based on previous literature, we hypothesize:
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H 1. Negative framing of the unemployed in news media will increase at a faster rate than
other kinds of framing within the analysis period.
H 2. Negative framing of the unemployed will be positively associated with negative
attitudes towards the unemployed at a national level.
Study 1a: Exploring frames used by politicians
Methods
To explore frames used by political elites, we investigated British Political Party leader’s
speeches at annual conferences1 from the two main parties (Labour and Conservative).
Speeches at annual conferences address members of the political parties, but also the
nation at large and establish key policy initiatives and their rationale. These speeches are
a key site where frames related to groups or issues within society are discussed
explicitly.
We sampled speeches from 1996, when the current main welfare payment for
unemployed citizens seekingwork (JSA)was introduced, until 2016when thenew regime
of UC began to be rolled out widely (n = 43 speeches). During this period, there were 10
party leaders (six Conservative, four Labour) of which five became (or were) Prime
Minister.2 Previous research has used such data to explore the construction of social
representations and their parameters (Gleibs, Hendricks, & Kurz, 2018; Obradovic &
Howarth, 2018; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996).
We used thematic analysis conducted with Nvivo software. The analysis focused on
politicians’ talk about unemployment broadly, including welfare benefits and unem-
ployed people specifically. We employ thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) for its
flexibility and focus on howunemployment and unemployed people are constructed.We
utilize an inductive approach to the data analysis, concentrating on the semantic content
of leader’s speeches rather than latent meaning. We move from direct coding, which is
descriptive, to summarization involving the interpretation of the overall meaning of
similar codes (themes). The analysis followed an iterative process of close reading of the
transcripts, followed by coding where political leaders discuss unemployment, then
grouping the codes into sub-themes and finally overarching themes. These overarching
themes are then taken as our frames throughout the rest of the paper (see Table 1).
Results
Overall, three prominent frames in the rhetoric of political leaders are evident. These
are ‘othering the unemployed’, ‘politics of unemployment’, and ‘welfare policy’. One of
these frames, ‘othering the unemployed’, is decidedly negative. The other two frames
are more neutral overall, as they can be presented as positive or negative depending on
the project of the speaker. We discuss each of the three frames below, drawing on sub-
themes only to illustrate the different ways in which the frames manifest in political
rhetoric.
1Retrieved from www.britishpoliticalspeech.org.
2 Both parties have spent a relatively equal number of years in power since 1996, 13 Labour and 15 Conservative.
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Othering the unemployed
‘Othering the unemployed’ represents a frame deployed by politicians to discuss the
individual attributes of unemployed people, and more broadly to distinguish the
unemployed from other citizens based on normative cultural differences. The use of the
term ‘othering’ denotes the sense of defining the unemployed as intrinsically different,
and subordinate to, the ‘average’ British citizen.
Almost half (n = 21) of all speeches in the data corpus refer in some way to specific
cultural norms of the unemployed that are responsible for their situation. For example:
We’re going to liberate people from the culture ofwelfare dependencywith aCommon Sense
Revolution. It’s time to insist that those who canwork, must work. (emphasis added;William
Hague, Conservative, 1999)
It is made apparent here that the unemployed are ‘choosing not to work’, and this
is proposed as a cultural norm of ‘welfare dependency’ in opposition to the rest of the
society. This differentiation builds separation between ‘us’ and the unemployed,
partitioning them as a cultural other. This notion is similar to the individualistic mode
of explanation for unemployment argued by Lewis, Snell, and Furnham (1987).
However, it goes further, considering that unemployed people have a shared culture
(Likki & Staerkle, 2015; Shildrick et al., 2014) and by the same token are apart from
the culture of the rest of society. The speaker (Hague) references a future project
based on ‘common sense’. This future project entails a society in which the culture of
welfare dependency is abolished and those who practise it are realigned with the rest
of society.
However, politicians do not only focus on the future project of the nation when
othering the unemployed by ascribing cultural differences to them. They also appeal to
the past, as a place where positive shared norms around work can be found:
Decades ago, when we had a universal collective culture of respect for work, a system of
unconditional benefits was good and right and effective. . . That culture doesn’t exist
anymore. In fact,worse than that, the benefit system itself encouragesabenefit culture . . . So
we will end the something for nothing culture (emphasis added; David Cameron,
Conservative, 2008)
Table 1. Relationship between themes and frames
Frame Search term
Global theme Othering the
Unemployed
Organizing theme Culture of the
Unemployed
Code ‘Something for
Nothing Culture’
Example text We will end the something
for nothing culture. If you
don’t take a reasonable
offer of a job, you lose
benefits
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Here,DavidCameron appeals to a historical periodwhen all citizens shared a culture of
work. He argues that this culture no longer exists, having been replaced by a ‘benefit
culture’, characterizing it by its ‘lack of respect for work’.
Politicians draw on and attempt to create, a shared understanding of a distinct sub-
culture of unemployment. This attempt is often signalled by an emphasis on state
dependency and more recently a ‘something for nothing culture’. This notional ‘myth of
voluntary unemployment’ (MacLeavy, 2011, p. 5) is deployed as an affront to the historical
national and cultural norms of British society as referenced in David Cameron’s statement
that in the past – ‘we had a universal collective culture of respect for work’.
Another strategy used by party leaders juxtaposes ‘hard-working, law-abiding people’
and ‘ordinary, working-class’ against the ‘culture of benefits’. Here, ‘hard-working’ is used
as a termwhich encapsulates British culture, clearly implying that thosewho do not work
are excluded from the constituency of political elites. For instance:
The Conservative Party has always stood for hard-working, law-abiding people. And we
stand for them again today. (Ian Duncan Smith, Conservative, 2003)
In 20 speeches, party leaders made direct reference to the ‘hard-working’, mainly
defining them as the population to which their party was focusing their attention and
policies. This helps to create a representation ofwho deserves support andwho should be
excluded. In some cases, the employed are directly contrasted with those who do not
work:
. . .hard working families who play by the rules are not going to see their opportunities
blighted by those that don’t. (Tony Blair, Labour, 2004)
Other research in this area has noted similar findings in the way that the unemployed
are not just defined, but also compared, with employed people (Gibson, 2009). We can
interpret this kind of rhetoric as identity entrepreneurship (Gleibs et al., 2018; Reicher
et al., 2005),where British identity is constructed aroundnotions of hardwork, effectively
excluding unemployed from belonging within the national identity.
This frame of ‘Othering the Unemployed’ may set ingroup boundaries that are defined
by engagement with the labour market. As such, those who are engaged with the labour
market become part of the ingroup to whom politicians’ direct rhetoric and policy,
whereas those claiming welfare benefits are excluded (i.e., made as an ‘other’ in
opposition to the ingroup norms of hard work). The ‘other’ here is demonized as a threat
to cultural norms and values. The unemployed are represented as responsible for their
own circumstances which necessitates radical action to eliminate the threat to the
national project. This kind of rhetoric when shared widely may encourage an anti-welfare
common sense (Slater, 2014) that is likely to be associatedwith negative attitudes towards
the unemployed nationally. However, such an association is yet untested.
Politics of unemployment
The second frame is ‘politics of unemployment’. It is often deployed to either aggrandize
the achievements of one’s political party or debase the record of another by referring to
the rate of unemployment, job creation, or other statistical measures. This frame was
present in 14 speeches.
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We set out to create jobs. And we are succeeding. Unemployment is lower here than in any
comparable country in Europe. In Britain it is falling. Across Europe it is not. (John Major,
Conservative, 1996)
Here, John Major attests to the conservative party’s success in reducing unemploy-
ment at a faster rate than other comparable nations. This claim implies that the economy is
doing well, and, by association, the Conservatives’ economic policies are succeeding.
So what have we seen? We’ve seen recession, higher unemployment, higher borrowing. I
don’t think that’s what people were promised. (Ed Miliband, Labour, 2012)
In this quote, Miliband, rather than praising his own party, discusses the failure of the
opposition (higher unemployment, higher borrowing) and questions their campaign
promises. Economics are instrumental in electoral politics and the perceived economic
aptitude of a party can be influential in elections. This frame generally represents how
party leaders frame the economic circumstances related to the rates of unemployment.
This comparison is done either by relation to previous British governments or by contrast
to similar foreign nations.
The importance of this frame is to construct an account of economic and therefore
political success or failure through unemployment. Notably, though, this frame is not
indicative of the kinds of people who are unemployed and therefore can be influential in
creating more sympathetic attitudes to unemployment. For instance, where unemploy-
ment is high, the electorate may be more compassionate towards the unemployed,
because economic circumstances are challenging. This consideration could give rise to
notions that unemployment is a matter of societal conditions and not reserved for a
specific sub-culture (Lewis et al., 1987). Literature that seeks to understand attitudes
towards the unemployed often distinguishes between individual and structural causes for
unemployment (Bullock, 1999; Feather, 1985; Piff et al., 2020). The political frame can
represent a structural cause for unemployment where high rates of unemployment or
related issues are foregrounded.
Welfare policy
Finally, in the ’welfare policy’ frame (n = 33 speeches), politicians use unemployment,
and the dangers it poses, as a platform for supporting new initiatives. Through this
analysis, we can trace the introduction of new policies and their perceived impact. For
example, John Major (Conservative) in 1996 states:
ThisweekweTories took a big step forwardwith the start of our new Job Seeker’s Allowance.
We do not want to pay people to stay on the dole. We do want to help them get back into
work.
Political elites deploy the frame as a solution to the problems of either thewelfare state
broadly or unemployment specifically. Also, in some cases, politicians are explicit about
the kinds of unemployed people who will benefit from new policies:
We are adding today the option of self employment as part of the new deal. But they have to
take one of the options on offer. We want single mothers with school age children at least to
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visit a job centre, not just stay at homewaiting for the benefit cheque everyweek (Tony Blair,
Labour, 1997)
Here Tony Blair portrays an image of a single mother, conjuring the trope of the
‘welfare queen’ (Bullock, Fraser Wyche, & Williams, 2001; Chauhan & Foster, 2014;
Fletcher et al., 2016). The policy solution, in this case, provides state assistance
conditional on attending a jobcentre. Conditionality of welfare payments introduced
during this period changed thewelfare system drastically (Dwyer, 2004; Dwyer &Wright,
2014). More recent changes are an advancement of this idea:
With us, if you’re out of work, you will get unemployment benefit. . .but only if you go to the
Job Centre, update your CV, attend interviews and accept the work you’re offered. (David
Cameron, Conservative, 2014)
This more recent form of conditionality includes receiving assistance only if
unemployed people ‘accept the work they’re offered’. The welfare policy frame, then,
narrates the conditions upon which unemployed persons and others can receive
assistance. The benefits of each initiative are outlined in terms of their impact either
directly on the unemployed, or on fiscal savings (Fletcher et al., 2016).
Discussion
Each frame can, and often is, deployed alongside the others. Political elites may describe
unemployed people in away that frames them as an outgroup,while in the same narrative
discussing the economic context and offering policy solutions. However, it is useful for
answering our research questions about the development of frames over time and their
association with attitudes, to separate these into distinct categories. Moreover, although
used in conjunction, the frames that we have identified are both internally homogeneous
and externally heterogeneous and refer to distinct rhetorical elements.
It is also important to note that the language used to invoke each frame has changed
over time and certain phrases that were present in the early speeches are not present in
later speeches, such as the notion of ‘yob culture’ to denote mainly working-class
unemployed young men (McDowell, 2007). This development provides support for the
analysis method. By directly examining language longitudinally, we can be confident that
we have captured a variety of ways in which each frame is deployed and not only the
current acceptable terminology.
Through this analysis, we have shown that politicians do frame the unemployed in
negative ways in the context of party leaders’ speeches. This understanding provides a
useful first step in ascertaining whether negative frames have become more prevalent
between the introductionof JSA andUCusing an ecologically valid analysis of theways the
frames are deployed in naturalistic (for political elites) settings. However, this analysis
does not provide us with information about howwidely the frames are shared or whether
the use of these frames has increased. We address this question in study 1b.
Study 1b: Use and development of frames in national newspapers
Methods
As we are interested in the prevalence of frames relating to unemployment, those
newspapers that are most widely circulated are assumed to be the most precipitous of
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framing effects for the population at large. Furthermore, national newspapers have often
been considered an important medium through which ideas about unemployed people
are developed and transmitted (Bauer&Gaskell, 1999; Bullock, 1999; Bullock et al., 2001;
Chauhan & Foster, 2014; Dorey, 2010; Fraser, 1994).
In the United Kingdom, newspapers have a political orientation and lend support to
political parties; therefore, we have included a variety of newspapers with differing
political orientations and reporting style. Specifically, we include the following: The Daily
Mail (right-wing, tabloid, n = 16,7083), The Daily Telegraph (right-wing, broadsheet,
n = 26,2273), The Mirror (left-wing, tabloid, n = 17,4093), The Sun (right-wing, tabloid,
n = 18,9493), and The Daily Express4 (right-wing, tabloid, n = 18,7023). These newspa-
pers represent the five most widely circulated newspapers over the 22-year period of the
analysis. The Guardian (left-wing, broadsheet, n = 40,9063) was added to the analysis to
provide a full spectrum of political orientation and reporting style.
We collated keywords/phrases related to each frame from the political leaders’
speeches into a dictionary that indicated the presence of the frames. We only use
keywordswhich are direct quotations from leaders’ speeches (see Table 1). By only using
phrases used in the elite discourse, we solve issues of objectivity in researcher defined
dictionaries,whereword selection can be compromised by themethod of selection or the
researcher’s hypotheses. The keywords/phrases obtained from the political speeches
were used in a keyword search of the six selected UK newspapers over the same period
(1996–2017 inclusive) through the Factiva digital archive. Where applicable, all search
terms are truncated by use of an asterisk enabling returned results for all forms of the
word. The search result is the number of articles containing each searchword in each year
in all six newspapers (n = 167,723 across all years including duplicates). A proxy for the
total number of articles in each newspaper per year was obtained by using the search
word ‘the’ and following the same process (n = 13,368,184 including duplicates). We
therefore ascertain what proportion of the total number of articles contain the search
word in question by dividing the number of search word hits in each year by the total
number of articles in each year. Thus, in the analysis, increases in the use of a search term
are increases in the number of articles using that term as a proportion of the total in that
year. This is summed to give a total proportion for each frame. Following Phelps et al.
(2012), keywords/phrases returning less than 20 articles in the peak year were removed
leaving a total of 44 keywords/phrases to be included in the analysis (seeTable 2). Readers
will notice that the number of keywords/phrases used in each frame is unequal; this
reflects the language used by politicians which is specific to each frame. However, the
number of search words in each frame is not directly related to the number of articles
retrieved (Table 3).
Tounderstand how frameusage has changed over time in themedia,we employed two
statistical measures. The correlation between the proportion of articles containing the
searchword and linear time (Pearson’s r), and the estimatedmean annual change (EMAC).
The EMAC measure (Nafstad et al., 2013; Nafstad, Blakar, Carlquist, Phelps, & Rand-
Hendriksen, 2007, 2009; Phelps et al., 2012) is calculated using a relative linear regression
slope. This is done by dividing the regression slope (number of articles predicted by the
year) by themean number of articles per year for each keyword andmultiplying this figure
by 100. For example, if the search word ‘journal’ has a slope coefficient of 0.1 and an
3 Excluding duplicates
4 Analysis for this newspaper begins in 1997 because the Factiva archives’ records start for this paper in that year
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average of 10 articles per year for 20 years; then, the calculation would be 0.1/10 9 100.
Wewould then report an EMACof 1%, indicating an increase of usage by 1%each year over
20 years.
The EMAC accounts for factors not addressed by simple percentage calculations,
including consideration for keywords that begin at different points in the time series (for a
larger discussion of the EMAC, see Nafstad et al., 2009). We have varied the EMAC
calculation from previous research that looks directly at the number of times a word is
used by basing the calculation on the mean number of articles that include each search
term. This is necessary because we do not have a valid comparison with the development
of a large sample of popular words over time (e.g., Nafstad et al., 2013).
Results
Estimated mean annual change (EMAC)
The developmental changes in the usage of the three frames we have identified are
presented in Table 4. We see that the Othering frame has an EMAC increase of 2.7%
(M = .0036, SD = 0.00135), r = .49, p = .021 n = 22. EMAC scores of 3% or more are
considered high (Nafstad et al., 2013). This increase tells us that the Othering frame is
Table 2. Dictionary of words related to each frame
Search terms
Othering the unemployed Politics of unemployment Welfare policy
benefit claimant* job creation benefit* cap
benefit culture job crisis benefit* system
benefit fraud* job losses housing benefit*
broken society mass unemployment incapacity benefit*
claiming benefit* unemployment figure* income support
culture of dependency welfare bill* job centre*/jobcentre*
cycle of dependency youth unemployment job seekers allowance
hard-working famil* means tested benefit*
hard-working majority out-of-work benefit*
hard-working people troubled famil*
life on the dole unemployment benefit*
on benefit* welfare cap
ordinary working class welfare cut*
something for nothing culture welfare reform
striver* work capability assessment*
unemployment blackspot*
welfare cheat*
welfare claimant*
welfare dependency
welfare recipient*
welfare society
yob culture
5Mean and standard deviation here refer to the number of articles in the frame as a proportion of the total number of articles
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becoming a more popular narrative over time, which adds further credence to the
assertions of other researchers about the growing use of stigmatizing language to describe
unemployed people (Fletcher et al., 2016; Friedli & Stearn, 2015; Gibson, 2009).
This frame’s usage peaked in 2013 during the height of the conservative parties’
changes to social security provision. 2013 was also the year that UC was introduced to
replace a range of means-tested social security benefits (Fletcher et al., 2016). These facts
may suggest that the Othering frame is deployed during times of political change relating
to the provision of social security.
The politics of unemployment frame has an EMAC of 1.24% (M = .0038
SD = 0.0013), r = .24, p = .290 n = 22) indicating that the frames’ use is slightly
declining; however, given that the Pearson correlation is not significant, we conclude this
is amore volatile frame that relies heavily on the context of use. It is notable that the lowest
year in which this frame was present, as a proportion of all articles, was a year before the
financial crisis (2007) and its peak year was after the financial crisis began (2009). This
result indicates the ecological validity of the frames we have identified, given that they
mirror the socio-political context at the time.
Finally, the welfare policy frame has seen a trivial increase over the analysis period of
0.61% (M = .0052, SD = 0.0019), r = .11, p = .621, n = 22. However, it is to be noted
again that the correlation with linear time is not significant and therefore changing usage
of the frame is not related to the passage of time but rather other contextual variables.
Table 3. Total Articles retrieved from keyword search alongside total articles published in the relevant
newspapers
Year Total search word articles Total published articles
1996 3,244 200,759
1997 3,878 269,987
1998 4,865 308,644
1999 4,217 346,810
2000 4,355 400,832
2001 4,917 505,932
2002 4,213 566,286
2003 4,299 582,920
2004 5,168 588,140
2005 5,851 593,374
2006 5,190 611,433
2007 4,869 608,641
2008 8,274 609,942
2009 10,470 704,802
2010 14,187 737,008
2011 11,641 742,464
2012 13,320 789,391
2013 14,154 769,183
2014 11,192 767,516
2015 13,291 879,623
2016 9,576 923,958
2017 6,552 860,539
Total 167,723 13,368,184
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To summarize, the Othering frame has seen the greatest increases using the EMAC
measure and is significantly correlatedwith linear time. As such, H1 is confirmed; negative
framing of the unemployed in national news media is increasing at a faster rate than other
frames we have identified. Still, plotting these results against major political events shows
that these changes should be contextualized within the broader political landscape
(Figure 1). We see falls in the use of all three frames especially following the start of the
‘war on terror’ and large increases following the financial crisis and the onset of austerity.
Looking forward, we see a similar decline from the start of the Brexit referendumwhich is
likely to continueuntil theUnitedKingdom leaves the EU.Nevertheless, the upward trend
of ‘othering the unemployed’ is relatively stable from 2002 until the start of UC. We also
note that there was not a sustained increase in the use of the ‘politics of unemployment’
frame even during what was a sustained financial crisis.
Discussion
The results of study 1b show that negative framing of the unemployed has become more
prevalent in the analysed newspapers. The change in prevalence of negative framing of
the unemployed is significantly associated with linear time.
Figure 1. Scatterplot of the development of each frame over time.
Table 4. Estimated mean annual change results for articles between 1996 and 2017 inclusive
Search word
Correlation with linear
time (Pearson’s r) EMAC (%) Peak year Lowest year
Othering the unemployed .49* 2.69 2013 2002
Politics of unemployment .24 1.24 2009 2007
Welfare policy .11 0.61 2010 2002
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Thus,wehave provided evidence to reject the null hypothesis, that negative framing of
the unemployed does not increase at a faster rate than other kinds of framing. However,
this study does not show whether the increased use of framing has effects on the
populations’ attitudes towards unemployed people. That is, we have not shown what
frames do. In study 1c,we look at the relationship between the use of frames and attitudes
at the national level to test for possible framing effects.
Study 1c: Frames and the development of national attitudes towards the
unemployed
Methods
To ascertain whether changes in the use of different frames have any relationship with
overall national attitudes towards welfare recipients, we obtained BSA Survey data for the
period 1996–2017 for five variables related to unemployment. BSA survey is a
representative cross-sectional survey consisting of approximately 3,000 participants
per year. The variables chosen concern attitudes towards welfare and welfare recipients
and have been collected for a large majority of the analysis period. A time series of these
variables is presented in Figure 2.
The first variable we analysed was the proportion of respondents who disagree/
strongly disagree with the item ‘the government should spend more money on welfare
benefits’ (MOREWELF) on a five-point scale (N = 216, M = .32, SD = 0.05). The second
variable asks respondents to choose between two statements ‘benefits for unemployed
Figure 2. Scatterplot of British Social Attitude Survey data over time.
6 For each of these attitude variables, N refers to the number of waves analysed, that is, the number of years for which we have
data
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people are too low and cause hardship, OR benefits for unemployed people are too high
and discourage them from finding jobs’ (DOLE, N = 22, M = .50, SD = 0.10). Here, we
take the percentage of people who agree with the latter. The third variable examines the
percentage of people who agree/strongly agree with the statement ‘if welfare benefits
weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet’ (WELFEET,
N = 21,M = .48, SD = 0.07). Fourth,we investigate the proportion of peoplewho agree/
agree strongly ‘Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another’ (DOLEFIDL,
N = 21, M = .36, SD = 0.05). Finally, we use the variable UNEMPJOB which asks, ‘How
much do you agree or disagree that . . . around here,most unemployed people could find a
job if they really wanted one’. We take the percentage that agree or agree strongly
(UNEMPJOB, N = 21, M = .61, SD = 0.07).
We also include a measure of the unemployment rate from the Eurostat database. The
rate is the percentage of the working-age population in the United Kingdom who were
unemployed in the reference week, available for work, and actively seeking work. This
rate is distinct from the number of people claiming social security support because they
are unemployed, which is known as the ‘claimant count’. We also include this measure in
the correlation analysis. The claimant count data were drawn from the Office of National
Statistics (ONS) UK.
Results
To see whether there was an association between the use of the identified frames in
national newspapers (Othering the Unemployed, Politics of Unemployment and Welfare
Policy) and BSA measures related to unemployment, we conducted a correlational
analysis. Table 5 summarizes the results and shows that theOthering frame is consistently
associated with negative attitude measures in the population (except DOLEFIDL, which
was uncorrelated with any other variables and UNEMPJOB which was negatively
correlated with both Politics of Unemployment and Welfare Policy). Othering is also
significantly associated with the unemployment rate (r = .64, p = .001), However, it is
not significantly associatedwith themore direct measure, claimant count. This difference
is of note because it suggests that the actual number of people claiming social security
benefits is not an important prerequisite for heightened stigmatization of this group.
However, the unemployment rate is highly correlated with the claimant count. We may
speculate that where the unemployment rate rises, UK citizens, media, and politicians
may be sensitized to possible future rises in the claimant count, contributing to further
stigmatization of unemployed people who claim social security benefits.
Notably, our other frames are associated with UNEMPJOB and none of the other
attitude measures. This indicates that increased use of these frames reduces negative
attitudes towards the unemployed concerning their ability to find work. This adds
credence to our earlier assertion that highlighting structural rather than individual causes
of unemploymentmay ameliorate negative attitudes to the unemployed in thepopulation.
Overall though,wehave shown that negative framing of unemployedwelfare recipients is
positively associated with negative attitudes in the population, supporting H2.
Given that we intuitively may suspect the rate of unemployment is a confounding
variable in the association between negative framing and negative attitudes, we
conducted multiple linear regression to test the effects of the Othering frame on attitudes
when controlling for the unemployment rate. This process was done with each of the
attitude variables, though UNEMPJOB and DOLEFIDL are not reported here due to non-
significant correlations. The regression models for each of the other variables were
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T
a
b
le
5
.
M
e
an
s,
st
an
d
ar
d
d
e
vi
at
io
n
s,
an
d
co
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
co
n
fi
d
e
n
ce
in
te
rv
al
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
M
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
.O
th
e
ri
n
g
<
0
.0
1
<
0
.0
1
2
.P
o
lit
ic
s
<
0
.0
1
<
0
.0
1
.3
1
[
.1
3
,.
6
5
]
3
.P
o
lic
y
0
.0
1
0
.0
0
.8
3
**
.5
8
**
[.
6
3
,.
9
3
]
[.
2
1
,.
8
0
]
4
.D
O
L
E
0
.5
0
0
.0
9
.4
9
*
.
2
2
.1
2
[.
0
8
,.
7
5
]
[
.5
8
,.
2
3
]
[
.3
2
,.
5
2
]
5
.D
O
L
E
FI
D
L
0
.3
6
0
.0
5
.
0
7
.0
4
.
0
2
.
1
0
[
.4
9
,.
3
7
]
[
.3
9
,.
4
7
]
[
.4
5
,.
4
1
]
[
.5
1
,.
3
5
]
6
.M
O
R
E
W
E
L
F
0
.3
2
0
.0
5
.6
3
**
.2
8
.3
6
.6
1
**
.0
6
[.
2
7
,.
8
3
]
[
.1
8
,.
6
3
]
[
.0
8
,.
6
9
]
[.
2
4
,.
8
2
]
[
.3
8
,.
4
8
]
7
.W
E
L
FE
E
T
0
.4
8
0
.0
7
.6
7
**
.
0
8
.3
2
.9
0
**
.0
2
.7
8
**
[.
3
4
,.
8
6
]
[
.5
0
,.
3
6
]
[
.1
2
,.
6
6
]
[.
7
6
,.
9
6
]
[
.4
2
,.
4
4
]
[.
5
2
,.
9
1
]
8
.U
N
E
M
P
JO
B
0
.6
1
0
.0
7
.
3
3
.
7
0
**
.
6
1
**
.3
5
.3
2
.
0
3
.2
8
[
.6
7
,.
1
2
]
[
.8
7
,
.3
8
]
[
.8
3
,
.2
5
]
[
.1
0
,.
6
8
]
[
.1
3
,.
6
6
]
[ 
.4
5
,.
4
1
]
[
.1
8
,.
6
3
]
9
.U
n
e
m
p
lo
ym
e
n
t
R
at
e
(%
)
6
.1
0
1
.2
1
.6
4
**
.7
4
**
.7
4
**
.0
6
.
0
2
.4
9
*
.2
9
.
7
4
**
[.
2
9
,.
8
4
]
[.
4
5
,.
8
9
]
[.
4
6
,.
8
9
]
[
.3
8
,.
4
8
]
[
.4
6
,.
4
3
]
[.
0
6
,.
7
6
]
[
.1
8
,.
6
5
]
[
.8
9
,
.4
5
]
1
0
.C
la
im
C
o
u
n
t
(0
0
0
0
’s
)
1
1
8
1
.4
2
3
5
5
.4
3
.3
6
.7
8
**
.6
5
**
.
3
1
.0
9
.1
9
.
1
0
.
8
6
**
.9
1
**
[
.0
8
,.
6
9
]
[.
5
3
,.
9
1
]
[.
3
0
,.
8
4
]
[
.6
6
,.
1
4
]
[
.3
7
,.
5
1
]
[
.2
8
,.
5
8
]
[
.5
2
,.
3
5
]
[
.9
4
,
.6
6
]
[.
7
8
,.
9
6
]
N
ot
e.
M
an
d
SD
ar
e
u
se
d
to
re
p
re
se
n
t
m
e
an
an
d
st
an
d
ar
d
d
e
vi
at
io
n
,r
e
sp
e
ct
iv
e
ly
.V
al
u
e
s
in
sq
u
ar
e
b
ra
ck
e
ts
in
d
ic
at
e
th
e
9
5
%
co
n
fi
d
e
n
ce
in
te
rv
al
fo
r
e
ac
h
co
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
.
T
h
e
co
n
fi
d
e
n
ce
in
te
rv
al
is
a
p
la
u
si
b
le
ra
n
ge
o
f
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
co
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
s
th
at
co
u
ld
h
av
e
ca
u
se
d
th
e
sa
m
p
le
co
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
.
*I
n
d
ic
at
e
s
p
<
.0
5
;*
*
in
d
ic
at
e
s
p
<
.0
1
.
Elite stigmatization of the unemployed 15
significant, and the Othering frame was a significant predictor of these negative attitudes
even when controlling for the rate of unemployment (see Table 6).
General discussion
In study 1a, we provided evidence that politicians use at least three different frames to
discuss the unemployed and unemployment. One of these frames, ‘Othering the
Unemployed’ was decidedly negative. Our first hypothesis, that negative framing of the
unemployed increases at a faster rate than other frames found support using the EMAC
measure. We also found support for our second hypothesis that negative framing of the
unemployed would be positively correlated with negative attitudes towards the
unemployed. Additional evidence was found using multiple linear regression models
where we controlled for the unemployment rate, showing that over and above the effect
of the unemployment rate, there is a significant relationship between the Othering frame
and negative attitudes in the population.
Much of the framing literature does not unambiguously test relationships between
political framing, media framing, and attitudes nationally. In this paper, we provide a
specific test of this association between framing and attitudes towards the unemployed/
unemployment in the United Kingdom, tracing their usage, through both political
communication and widely shared newspaper reporting, longitudinally.
Through this methodology of tracking frames through different mediums of
communication, we support assertions from framing literature that suppose the
prevalence of, and exposure to, frames influence the attitudes of citizens towards the
object of the frame. In this case, leading to more negative attitudes towards the
unemployed in the general population. Thismethod is consistentwith conceptualizations
of framing that posit it as a political phenomenon originating with political elites (Jacoby,
2000) and not necessarily based on factual information (Hopkins, Sides, & Citrin, 2019)
such as the actual unemployment rate.
However, framing theoryprovides only apartial account ofwhere frames originate and
how they are developed in the public sphere. Here, an integration of the SRT literature is
useful to account for the development of frames through the interactivity of different
actors in the public sphere to define the issues associated with unemployment. Social
representations as we have described them, embed self-other relations in their consti-
tution. That is, social representations are intersubjectively agreed social realities. When
politicians seek to frame an issue, they must be aware of and consider, the possible
reactions, motives, and beliefs of the polity. As such, framing is not a unidirectional
relationship from political elites to citizens. Rather the assumed beliefs of citizens define
acceptable and popular frames on issues of political import.
Different social representations of the same issuemay exclude or diminish the veracity
of other representations (Howarth, 2006); this can explain how the ‘Othering’ frame
increases in use over time and in particular after the financial crises while other,
competing frames remain stagnant. This process alludes to the development of increasing
hegemony of the Othering frame to account for unemployment. The results support the
theoretical hypothesis that ‘otherising’, which relies on social psychological processes of
creating outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), is an effective frame in shaping social
attitudes. Such a frame it appears is much more compelling than the policy or political
domains which do not draw upon these social psychological processes.
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The results of this study have several implications. Foremost, they support both
academic and lay assertions that stigmatization of the unemployed is related to
political rhetoric and media elites. At a societal level, the ramifications of this may be
the open acceptance of stigmatization of the unemployed, making negative attitudes
towards the unemployed a common-sense, natural assertion. At the interpersonal
level, there are likely to be impacts on the social interactions of unemployed people.
Given that anti-welfare common sense is widespread it would be sensible for
unemployed individuals to assume that that identity would be stigmatized by relevant
others, thereby influencing their beliefs about others beliefs (Elcheroth et al., 2011).
Finally, at the personal level, it would also be possible for unemployed people to
internalize negative attitudes about unemployed people in general and apply those
attitudes to themselves. These personally applied negative attitudes may partially
explain the negative psychological effects associated with unemployment (McKee-
Ryan, Song, Wanberg, & Kinicki, 2005; Wanberg, 2012).
Other research in this area has often suggested that negative media and political
rhetoric towards marginalized groups would be associated with negative attitudes
towards those groups. However, this study is the first instance (that we know of)
where longitudinal data have been used to track this association over time within the
context of unemployment in the United Kingdom, using ecologically valid data to
ascertain how different narratives are deployed and change over time. As such, this
study presents strong evidence that the unemployed have become a more stigmatized
group over time worthy of the attention of researchers in social psychology and
related disciplines.
Limitations
There are some limitations of this study. First, there are issueswith howour dictionarywas
produced. Becausewe have used party leaders’ speeches at national conferences,wemay
not have captured all the phrases which indicate the presence of the frames we have
identified. Political speeches are a more contrived, formal mode of communication than
everyday language (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). As such, we may not capture the more
derogatory phrases used in informal communication and therefore not fully capture all
articles which invoke the frames we identified.
Secondly, this research is limited by the relatively low number of time-series
observations used in the analysis (BSA, n = 21/22, Newspaper, n = 22). However, post-
hoc power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) suggests that
based on the mean correlation between negative framing (Othering) and attitudes (.59)
then n = 22 obtains statistical power of .85. Nevertheless, other frames may have smaller
effects that we are not able to capture.
We also note the limitations of correlational studies and the inability to understand
causal effects. Still, we feel that experimental data are not appropriate for this paper, as the
conditions of repeated exposure to frames in the societal context cannot be reproduced
satisfactorily in laboratory settings. We have additional confidence in these results
because we have controlled for (in study 1c) the effects of the actual unemployment rate
on attitudes and have still obtained a significant effect of theOthering frame.However,we
also attempted to explore whether a lagged time-series analysis would be appropriate
(following Kellstedt, 2000; Russell Neuman, Guggenheim, Mo Jang, & Bae, 2014), but the
number of data points was insufficient for a reliable analysis.
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Further research
Further research is needed to ascertain the generalizability of the findings of this study
with other target groups. It should be possible, using the methodology described here, to
examine attitudes towards a wide array of stigmatized groups, if that stigmatization is
prevalent in public discourse.
In addition, researchers interested in this topic may look to pin down the direction of
causality in the relationship between political rhetoric, media reporting, and individual
attitudes. Though it should be noted that our theoretical perspective (SRT) dictates that at
any point in the causal chain, there is at least an implicit negotiation between self and
other, such that each actor, be it, politician, newspaper, or individual is considering the
representations, values, beliefs, and identities of others when making decisions about
frames to employ (Gillespie, 2008).
As we have noted, political language and mass media can change the nature of social
reality by presenting new knowledge about groups and objects in the social world. This
influence is, at least in part, because these actors (politicians andmedia) are seen as being
prototypicalmembers of British society (Haslam&Reicher, 2007; Reicher et al., 2005). As
such, knowledge production and common-sense making are about what we think others
think of an issue. This notion has been variously described as meta-knowledge or meta-
representation (Elcheroth et al., 2011). To understand the effects of stigmatization on the
unemployed, empirical research should investigate the relationship between represen-
tations and meta-representations in the context of stigmatized identities. That is, to what
extent does stigmatization effect how unemployed people think about their own
identities and how they think, others think, about their identities, i.e., meta-identification?
Conclusion
Nothing can be inferred from an individual’s employment status about what kind of
person they are. Yet, in this paper, we have shown that indeed, employment status is used
to infer a variety of negative individual attributes, which designate unemployed people as
a cultural other.When thesemodes of communication are deployedbypolitical andmedia
elites, they influence the attitudes of citizens towards unemployed people, often in
stigmatizing ways. This relationship between framing and attitudes towards the
unemployed does not go away when we include the actual unemployment rate.
These results provide cause for concern around the lived experience of unemploy-
ment considering the stigmatization that people who find themselves out of work face.
Coping with a stigmatized social identity is beset with challenges and may reduce the
ability of unemployed individuals to find work or seek support to do so. In this paper, we
have provided evidence that this stigmatization exists, but more work is needed to
understand what its effects are on work-related outcomes. Social scientists and
policymakers would do well to turn their attention to understanding and creating
systems and policieswhichwould enable positive social identities to be sustained, even in
unemployment. Such an approach would surely provide common benefit to society, as
well as the individual.
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